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Abstract: We present a first random number generator (RNG) which 
simultaneously uses independent spatial and temporal quantum randomness 
contained in an optical system. Availability of the two independent sources 
of entropy makes the RNG resilient to hardware failure and signal injection 
attacks. We show that the deviation from randomness of the generated 
numbers can be estimated quickly from simple measurements thus 
eliminating the need for usual time-consuming statistical testing of the 
output data. As a confirmation it is demonstrated that generated numbers 
pass NIST Statistical test suite. 
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1. Introduction 
The ability to generate random numbers is an important resource in many areas of science and 
technology: computer security, cryptography, probabilistic computation (Monte Carlo), over-
Turing computing techniques (e.g. randomized algorithms), simulations, labeling of prepaid 
and gift cards, industrial testing, online hazard games and automata, scientific research etc. 
The vast majority of today's computers are deterministic (e.g. PCs, tablets and mobile 
phones), and so they cannot per se create random numbers: that task is left to a random 
number generator (RNG). Random number generators are usually categorized as either 
pseudo random (PRNG) or physical or “true” random number generators (TRNG). 
A PRNG is a mathematical formula, or more generally a deterministic algorithm which, 
starting from a certain initial number (seed) that defines the initial state, produces a string of 
numbers that looks random in the sense that it possesses a certain set of desirable statistical 
properties, but in fact is completely deterministic and highly losslessly compressible by 
definition [1], neither of which should be a characteristic of a truly random sequence. 
Although there is no criterion for an algorithm to be named a “PRNG”, the only 
undisputable characteristic of any PRNG is that it is provably non-random because it is 
already known how to predict all the numbers in the pseudo random sequence, namely by 
using the very PRNG algorithm. Nevertheless, PRNGs are very frequently used: their 
popularity stems from the fact that they can be realized as a piece of software and run on a 
computer or programmable devices (mobile phone, smart card, etc.) thus offering an illusion 
that the device now also has access to random numbers without any cost in additional 
hardware! However, while algorithmically generated pseudo random numbers can be used for 
some applications, they are by construction deterministic and therefore, at least in theory, 
predictable which makes them risky for use in cryptography [2] as well as frequent cause of 
erroneous results in statistical calculations and simulations [3,4]. 
A non-determinism is sought in physical RNGs, notably quantum random number 
generators (QRNG) that extract random numbers by performing repeated measurements on a 
certain, specially prepared quantum systems [5–9]. The rationale behind QRNGs is that 
quantum theory allows the existence of fundamentally random and unpredictable physical 
processes such that one can, in principle, extract truly random numbers from them. 
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This paper is organized as follows. First, we present an original analysis of well known 
“spatial” and “temporal” optical quantum random number generating principles. Next, based 
on gained insights, we construct a new bit extracting principle with significantly improved 
characteristics. Its notable novelty is simultaneous extraction of two independent random bit 
strings one from spatial and other from temporal quantum information contained in the 
proposed optical system, utilizing the same set of photon detections. Finally, we build and test 
a physical QRNG based on the new principle. Yet another novelty in our approach is that we 
prove limits of deviation from randomness based on a set of simple measurements. 
2. Beam splitter spatial method (BSR) 
A well known beam splitting principle of generating random binary numbers (bits) [10], [5] is 
shown in Fig. 1. Ideally, a light beam ( )ψ  is split by a balanced beam splitter (BS) causing 
independent, equally probable photon detections by the two identical detectors D0 and D1 
sitting at each exit arm of the BS. A detection by D0 is defined as generation of bit value “0” 
whereas a detection by D1 is defined as generation of a bit value “1”. Because the value of a 
random number depends on the position at which the photon is detected, this method is 
sometimes referred to as “spatial”. 
To overcame inevitably imperfect balance of the BS and detectors, in our implementation 
we use two neutral density filters, shown in Fig. 1, that allow us to equalize photon detection 
probabilities of the two detectors. The CW light source is a red LED (Hamamatsu L7868, 
670λ =  nm, 30λΔ =  nm FWHM) powered by an adjustable current source that allows us to 
run the random number generator at various photon detection rates. The beam splitter BS is a 
fusion fiber 50:50 splitter (Thorlabs FC632-50B-FC). The two near-identical photon counting 
detectors D0 and D1 are based upon SLiK diodes recovered from Excelitas SPCM-AQRH 
modules, complemented by a home-made active quenching circuits and operated at −10 °C. 
They feature the dead time of 24 ns, dark count rate of ~ 250  cps, afterpulsing lifetime of 
~ 33aτ  ns and visible afterpulsing probability (afterpulses visible after the dead time) of 
about 0.031ap = . 
 
Fig. 1. Optical part of the beam splitter quantum random number generator consists of the 
beam splitter BS, detectors D0 and D1, fixed neutral density filter NDF and variable neutral 
density filter VNDF. The two filters allow for fine equalizing the probabilities of generating 
ones and zeros. 
Even though the beam splitter method in theory generates perfect random numbers, we 
will show that when it is used with continuous random light (we name it the BSR method) it 
is quite sensitive to imperfections in the experimental setup notably those of the detectors. Bit 
sequences generated by any physical RNG generally feature two types of deviations from 
randomness which seem unavoidable: bias and correlations among bits. Bias is a measure of 
uneven probability of generating ones and zeros and is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )1 (0) 11 .
2 2
p p
b p
−
= = −  (1) 
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Following the above definition, an estimate of bias of a string of bits {0,1}ix ∈  is obtained as: 
 1 1ˆ .
2
N
ii
x
b
N
=
= −
  (2) 
with the variance of 1/ (2 )N . Sources of bias in the BSR method are: (1) unbalanced beam 
splitter; and (2) uneven detection efficiencies of the two detectors. In the BSR random number 
generator, it is virtually impossible to eliminate bias by shear manufacturing precision of the 
components to a level that would not be (easily) detectable by statistical tests. Bias itself can 
be strongly reduced or eliminated altogether by post-processing techniques like Von 
Neumann scheme [12] but exact de-biasing works only if there are no correlations among bits. 
Unlike bias, which can be expressed by a single number, correlations among bits can be 
arbitrarily complex and generally cannot be expressed by a single quantity. Nevertheless the 
description can be simplified by realizing that memory effects in detectors, that cause 
correlations among bits, are strongly localized in time [13]. If the mean period between 
detections is long enough, only neighboring bits are non-negligibly correlated. Under that 
assumption, correlation among bits can be well characterized by only the serial 
autocorrelation coefficient with lag 1. Serial autocorrelation coefficients are defined as (see 
Ref [14].): 
 
( )( )
( )
1
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N k
i i ki
k N k
ii
x x x x
a
x x
−
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=
−
=
− −
=
−

  (3) 
where ka  is a serial autocorrelation coefficient with lag k  and N  is number of bits in the 
sequence. For finite N , an estimate given by Eq. (3) has 1 sigma Gaussian statistical error of 
1/ N k− . 
In the BSR method, correlations among bits are caused mainly by dead time and 
afterpulsing in detectors. To see that, let us a suppose that faint continuous Poisson random 
light, such as for example generated by an LED or well saturated laser, is shone upon the 
beam splitter causing photons to be detected by each detector with a mean detection period τ . 
Let us further suppose that the two detectors have identical dead time dτ . In case that the next 
photon “arrives” in less than dτ  after the previous one, it can either hit the detector that is in 
the dead state or would get detected by the other detector thus contributing to the negative 
autocorrelation of the sequence of generated bits. The dead time reduces the probability of 
successive detections by the same detector, that is that the generated bit string misses some of 
the substrings “00” and “11”, at random places, with respect to the string that would have 
been obtained from the same source of photons should the dead time be zero. Since omission 
of longer same-digit sequences is much les probable, the leading effect is relative excess of 
substrings “01” and “10” observed as a negative value of the autocorrelation coefficient 1a , 
henceforth denoted a  and referred to as “autocorrelation”. Its magnitude is approximately 
equal to probability dp  that a photon “falls” into the dead time: 
 1 
d d
da p e
τ
τ
τ
τ
−
= − = − ≈ −  (4) 
where the approximation is valid for τd << τ. In our case, the mean photon frequency could be 
10 MHz (i.e. τ  = 100 ns) and dead time dτ  = 24 ns leading to a  ≈-0.24: an imperfection 
statistically detectable with only 17 generated bits! Even with an unrealistically short dead 
time, at a sufficiently high detection (i.e. bit production) rate, the autocorrelation becomes un-
#231845 - $15.00 USD Received 5 Jan 2015; revised 8 Mar 2015; accepted 24 Mar 2015; published 24 Apr 2015 
© 2015 OSA 4 May 2015 | Vol. 23, No. 9 | DOI:10.1364/OE.23.011619 | OPTICS EXPRESS 11622 
 
 
tolerably high. The highest counting rate of the detector is 1/ dτ  and in that limit 1a  is 
approaches −1. To achieve lower correlation one needs to operate at a lower detection 
frequency, but then only a small portion of detector capabilities can be exploited for random 
number generation. In our previous work [13] we showed that correlation does not vanish in 
the low detection frequency end either: instead, it asymptotically reaches the value of the 
visible afterpulsing probability dp  which in our case is about 0.031. 
For completeness we note that the beam splitter method can also be performed with a 
periodically pulsed light source, such as described in [5]. In that case a photon detection time 
is precisely known and a narrow gate around it can be used to strongly reduce afterpulsing 
and dark counts noises. Furthermore, dead time effects can be completely avoided simply by 
choosing pulse repetition period longer than the dead time. However, such a system does not 
posses time arrival randomness that we use in our COMBO method described in the Section 
4. 
In [13] we have already noted that positive and negative autocorrelation mechanisms in 
the BSR method cancel each other at a certain detection rate. Namely, following each photon 
detection there is a constant probability (on the order of a percent) that meta-stable deep states 
lying between Fermi and conductive band of the solid-state avalanche photodiode get filled. 
Each of these states decays randomly with a characteristic lifetime. In our case, lifetimes are 
short with respect to the dead time and therefore most of the afterpulses will contribute to 
generating substrings of “00” or “11” at random occasions times. Since the two processes are 
independent of each other, the resulting net correlation a  is a sum of the two contributions: 
 . daa p
τ
τ
= −  (5) 
and vanishes for a detection rate 0 1/ / .a df pτ τ= =  For our detectors having 0.031ap =  and 
24dτ =  ns the vanishing point is at 0 1.3f ≈  Mcps, which is quite low with respect to their 
counting capability of over 25 Mcps. 
In this work we go further by noting an effect that, in principle, enables total elimination 
of the autocorrelation. First we note that by ignoring detections that came from one detector in 
less than a prescribed blanking time tΔ  after detection by the other detector, helps to reduce 
correlations significantly. Specifically, in order to completely remove the anti-correlation 
caused by the dead time, it would be enough to take the blanking time ( tΔ ) any higher than 
the dead time because then the dead time would have no effect on photons selected for 
generation of random numbers. However, positive autocorrelation due to afterpulses 
appearing after tΔ  would be left over causing a small positive autocorrelation. In order to 
overcome that, we note that by taking a suitable tΔ , slightly smaller than the dead time, one 
can obtain, in principle, an arbitrarily high detection frequency 0f  at which the two 
competing effects (negative and positive) cancel each other. Note that below 0f  the total 
autocorrelation is positive due to dominant effect of the afterpulsing, whereas above 0f  
autocorrelation turns negative due to dominant effect of the dead time. We have therefore 
implemented a circuit blanking out (omitting) any event(s) that come sooner than tΔ  after the 
previous one. All electronics circuits in this study have been realized by Altera MAX3000 
family CPLD chip. Due to the discrete delay times available in the CPLD chip, duration of the 
blanking time tΔ  is adjustable in the range from 5.6 ns in steps of 4.0 ns, while dead times of 
the two detectors D0 and D1 used in this work are fixed to 24 ns. 
In our analysis we assume that higher-lag autocorrelation coefficients , 1ka k >  are much 
smaller than 1a . We find that a detection rate of 10 Mcps is a good trade-off between a high 
bit production rate and appearance of longer-lag correlations due to afterpulsing. Fixing the 
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detection rate to 10 Mbps and varying tΔ  we find that the lowest autocorrelation is obtained 
for 17.6tΔ =  ns and is then equal to 6(280 32) 10−± ⋅  as evaluated by statistics of 910  bits. 
All higher lag coefficients are consistent with zero within the statistical error. 
 
Fig. 2. Autocorrelation coefficient for the BSR method a as a function of the detection 
frequency f  of detectors D0 and D1, for the blanking time 17.6tΔ =  ns. One sigma 
statistical error bars are smaller than the dots sizes. 
Fixing tΔ  to 17.6 ns the autocorrelation as a function of detection rate has been evaluated 
according to Eq. (3), with statistics of 910N =  bits. The result shown in Fig. 2. confirms the 
expected sign change near 10 Mcps. 
3. Photon pair waiting times difference method (T1T2) 
The biggest challenge in realization of a good quantum (or any other physical) RNG is that it 
is difficult to realize a setup close to the theoretical idealization, especially if there is anything 
that must be adjusted prior to use. For example to adjust bias in BSR methods to within 1/N 
one must generate at least ~N2 bits to test the adjustment and is therefore faced with an 
insurmountable time consuming task. Even if sufficiently fine adjustment could be done, there 
is a question of whether it would stay stable over time withstanding temperature, power 
supply and other variations as well as aging and wear of components. 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the T1T2 method. Three subsequent random events (detected photons) 
define two intervals: 
1
T  and 
2
T . If 
21
T T>  then 0 is generated, if 
12
T T>  then 1 is generated 
whereas if 
21
T T=  then events are skipped and no random bit is generated. 
Therefore, especially valuable are random number generating methods that do not require 
any adjustments. One such method has been proposed in [9]. A time-wise random stream of 
electrical (logic) pulses is obtained from a random event generator (REG) which generates 
electrical pulses whose waiting-times obey an exponential probability density function (p.d.f). 
Three consecutive pulses from the REG, as shown in Fig. 3, are used to define time intervals 
1T  (between the first two) and 2T  (between second and third). A random bit is then generated 
by comparing the two intervals: if 21T T>  then value 0 is generated; if 12T T>  then value 1 is 
generated; if 21T T=  (within the measurement precision) then no bit is generated. In order to 
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maximize the bit efficiency, the third event is taken as the first event of the next triplet, thus 
two events are spent to generate one random bit. If the REG source is stationary and 
memoryless, which is indicated by an exponential time interval distribution, the bits will be 
uncorrelated and, due to exchangeability of definitions of 0 and 1, the bias will be zero. 
The crucial insight achieved in [9] is that clocks which measure photon time intervals 
must be started in synchronization with beginning of each interval, otherwise the method 
would produce correlated bits even if fed by perfectly random events. This was not 
understood in previous art, like for example in [7] where the clock was free-running which 
must have yielded correlated bits, but it was not noted probably because clock frequency 
(~10MHz) was much higher than the source mean frequency (~10kHz) and in that case 
correlations are small. Correlations rise quickly as the ratio of frequencies of clock and source 
of random events becomes smaller [7]. Afterpulsing in detectors causes some correlation, but 
much smaller than in BSR method because they appear at random times and merely slightly 
modify the exponential waiting-time distribution. 
4. Combined spatio temporal method with improved randomness (COMBO) 
The two above described random number generating methods offer a range of randomness 
quality, bits-per-photon efficiency and resilience to hardware imperfections. However, at the 
present level of technology, even with the most optimal method, the leftover randomness 
imperfections are typically larger than what is acceptable by general applications. As 
illustrated there is always some hardware detail that limits the randomness and which cannot 
be further improved with a given level of hardware technology. 
In order to arrive to a better randomness of generated bits, one can use deterministic 
postprocessing (extractor algorithms [15,16], resilient functions [17,18]) or non-deterministic 
postprocessing (i.e. using additional sources of entropy). Postprocessing comes with a price of 
additional hardware and/or software resources. In order to simplify postprocessing or avoid it 
altogether, it is therefore legitimate to ask whether a better bit extraction method can be 
construed that would both feature lower sensitivity to hardware imperfections and provability 
of randomness of the extracted bits. 
To that end we proceed by noting that in the BSR method (explained in the previous 
section), there are two independent random processes, each of which allows for random bit 
extraction. Namely, the time when a photon is detected (by either detector) is, at least in 
theory, completely independent of where it is detected (by which detector). Therefore, one 
can exploit temporal information of a train of photons detected by either detector D0 or D1 to 
generate a sequence of random bits via T1T2 method, and at the same time use spatial 
information of the same detected photons to generate an independent sequence of random bits 
via BSR method. This method we name “COMBO” as it combines the two random number 
generating principles. It is to be contrasted to other methods that combine two independent 
random strings obtained from two independent set of measurements, such as [24], because in 
COMBO we obtain two entirely independent random bit strings by processing the same set of 
measurements performed simultaneously on an optical quantum system. 
The optical part of the COMBO RNG is shown in Fig. 1. Variable filter VNDF makes 
possible fine adjustment of the bias Sb  of the BSR section to (0 0.001)±  with stability better 
than 0.0005±  during experiments. 
Photon detections from the two detectors are combined by the electrical circuit shown in 
Fig. 4, which functions as follows. In order to extract the timing information, pulse trains 
from the two detectors are interleaved by a summing circuit to form a single train of pulses 
which is then processed according to the T1T2 method. This yields one string of random bits, 
let us denote it with T  for “time”. At the same time, the two pulse trains are processed 
according to the BSR method explained above. This yields the other string of random bits 
related to the space information, let us denote it with S  for “space”. Note that the very same 
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photo-detection signals are used to generate both strings T  and S . Each of these two 
independent bit strings will have its own bias and autocorrelation, let us denote them as 
( , )T Tb a  and ( ),S Sb a  respectively. 
 
Fig. 4. Functional schematic of the circuit for realizing the COMBO random number 
generating method illustrating how intermediate strings T, S, Y and final string C are 
generated. 
Since, in principle, the BSR method produces one bit per detected photon and T1T2 
produces one bit per two detected photons, we need to decide how to combine these two bit 
streams. One way is to omit every second BSR bit: this would result in a string with much 
lower (squared) auto correlation but would not affect the bias. In order to improve both on 
bias and correlation, the COMBO method uses XOR of non-overlapping pairs of consecutive 
bits from the BSR method yielding new string ( ),Y Yb aY . This is accomplished by the D-type 
flip-flop and XOR gate XOR1 shown in the Fig. 4. Finally the two random strings T  and Y  
are XOR-ed (by the gate XOR2) to yield the final string ( ),C Cb aC . In order to calculate 
estimates of Cb  and Ca  we use two assumptions discussed above: (1) both BSR and T1T2 
methods suffer only from short-lag correlations; (2) random strings generated by two methods 
are independent of each other. Both assumptions are checked by the data themselves. Note 
that the T1T2 section is only fed by events passed through the blanking filter of the BSR, 
even though blanking is not necessary for that section, in order to prevent too often clocking 
of the BSR section that would induce positive correlation in the string S . 
For generation of random numbers, the power of the CW source is adjusted such that each 
detector counts with an average frequency of (10.00 0.005)±  Mcps, in total 20 million random 
events per second. In principle this would result in random bit generation rate of 10 Mbps 
since the bit production is clocked by T1T2 section which uses 2 detections per bit, however 
due to the blanking the bit rate is approximately 8.0 Mbit/sec. 
In order to estimate quality of randomness at the output (sequence C ) sequences S  and 
T  were generated the circuit shown in Fig. 4. Statistics of 92 10⋅  bits for string S  and 91 10⋅  
for string T  were collected. Statistical analysis of the recorded random bits according to Eqs. 
(2) and (3) yielded the following estimates: 6(227 16 1ˆ ) 0Sb
−
= ± ⋅ , 6( 149 32) ˆ 10Sa
−
= − ± ⋅  and 
6( 125 16) 1ˆ 0Tb
−
= − ± ⋅ , 6ˆ (48 32) 10Ta
−
= ± ⋅ . The error bars are plus minus 1 Gaussian sigma, 
estimated as explained in the Section 2. We find that second and further autocorrelation 
coefficients ( 2k ≥ ) for either of the two strings are consistent with zero within statistical 
uncertainty. This is expected since the system has no intentional memory and the correlation 
among bits dies off very quickly with the lag. Achieved randomness merits (bias and 
correlation) of strings S  and T  are not good enough for general applications, consequently 
we need some kind of randomness extraction. One could, in principle, estimate min-entropy 
of the strings following the approach in [25], after which an efficient universal hashing 
extractor would be applied to the raw bits. In this work however, we use a chained XOR 
extractor, depicted in Fig. 4, which is much less efficient in terms of number of extracted bits 
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versus number of input bits, but also much simpler to realize in hardware. In order to estimate 
randomness merits of the COMBO RNG we start by considering the string Y , derived from 
string S , for which the following relation holds [19]: 
 2 2 212 2 2
4 2
S
Y S S S S
a
b b a b b = − − − ≈ − −    (6) 
 
( )
( )
2
2
2
1
2 4
11 2 1
4
S S S
Y S S
S S
a a b
a a b
a b
−
= ≈ 
− − −  
 (7) 
where the approximations are valid when 1Sa   and 2 0.25Sb   which is satisfied in our 
case. This yields: 6ˆ (75 16) 10Yb
−
= ± ⋅ , 6ˆ (0 21) 10Ya
−
= ± ⋅ . Again, higher lag correlations are 
consistent with zero within statistical error margins. 
Bit-by-bit XOR-ing of two independent sequences T  and Y  yields the final sequence C  
with bias and correlation given by [11]: 
 2C T Yb b b= −  (8) 
 ( )2 24C T Y T Y Y Ta a a a b a b= + +  (9) 
The above relations may give an over-optimistic result if the two sequences are correlated, 
that is if normalized cross-correlation coefficients defined as: 
 ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1
2 2
1 1
 
N k
i i ki
TY N k N k
i ii i
t t y y
a k
t t y y
−
+
=
− −
= =
− −
=
− −

 
 (10) 
are non-zero for some k. Since the memory effects in the system (dead time and afterpulsing) 
are shorter than the average period of generated bits (100 ns) it is enough to check a few 
values of k around 0. To that end strings T  and Y , each 93 10⋅  bits long, were generated 
simultaneously and cross-correlation coefficients for lag k in the range [ 6, 6]−  estimated 
according to Eq. (10). Obtained values shown in the Fig. 5. along with 1 sigma Gaussian error 
bars (evaluated as 1/ )N k−  are consistent with zero within statistical errors thus 
confirming the non-correlation hypothesis. 
 
Fig. 5. Cross-correlation coefficients of spatial and temporal bit strings in the COMBO 
quantum random number generator. 
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Finally, we obtain 8(7.1 1.6)ˆ 10Cb
−
= ± ⋅ , 12ˆ (3.7 1.2) 10Ca
−
= ± ⋅  . In order to measure errors 
of that magnitude with 95% C.L. one would need to generate a string of at least 136 10⋅  bits. 
Thus we prove that any generated string shorter than that is indistinguishable from a true 
random string and in that case there is no need to do any further tests of the generated output. 
This is quite different from established state of the art where randomness is only tested for 
strings of typically only 910  bits or shorter [24]. Nevertheless, as a cross-check, we also 
perform “standard” statistical analysis of several sequences of 910  bits by means of the NIST 
statistical test suite (STS, version 2.2.1) [20] using the default test parameters. Result obtained 
for a typical sequence is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Typical results of the NIST Statistical Test Suite 
Statistical test p-value Proportion/Threshold Pass 
Frequency 0.75186 991/980 Yes 
Block frequency 0.82372 991/980 Yes 
Cumulative sums 0.63859 992/980 Yes 
Runs 0.67868 991/980 Yes 
LongestRun 0.48464 982/980 Yes 
Rank 0.35864 994/980 Yes 
FFT 0.95120 992/980 Yes 
NonOverlappingTemplate 0.44015 990/980 Yes 
OverlappingTemplate 0.18454 992/980 Yes 
Universal 0.97305 989/980 Yes 
ApproximateEntropy 0.56463 992/980 Yes 
RandomExcursions 0.48645 628/622 Yes 
RandomExcursionsVariant 0.44883 628/622 Yes 
Serial 0.47577 989/980 Yes 
LinearComplexity 0.72582 989/980 Yes 
    
5. Study of resilience against hardware failure and signal injection attacks 
When a RNG is used in a critical application (e.g. for cryptographic security) it is important 
that it possess a resilience to common attacks and most probable hardware failure scenarios 
while allowing for robust monitoring of its proper functioning. 
For COMBO RNG, in case that one of the detectors (D0, D1) fails completely (i.e. stops 
generating pulses), the BSR extraction method will be either stuck to logic 1 or logic 0, 
depending on whether D0 or D1 failed, respectively. However the T1T2 section will still 
function normally albeit at only a half rate. As a result, randomness of the output will be 
slightly reduced (to that of the T1T2 section) while the bit production rate will be halved. In 
case of partial reduction of detection rate of one of detectors, BSR section will generate a 
heavily biased sequence.  In that case, according to Eqs. (8) and (9), randomness of output 
bits should be better than of the T1T2 method alone. This is indeed confirmed by an 
experiment in which average detection frequency of D0 was kept fixed at (10.00 0.05)±  
Mcps while that of D1 ( D1f ) was varied from zero to 10 Mcps in order to simulate its full or 
partial failure. Results plotted in Fig. 6. show that, due to rate mismatch between D0 and D1, 
the BSR section generates highly biased and correlated output which improves as D1f  
approaches D0 f . The bias Yb  is out of the scope for all points except for D1 10f =  MHz while 
autocorrelation Ta  is shown. Even so, randomness merits of the combined output, namely Ca  
and Cb  are improved with respect to those of the T1T2 section ( Ta , Tb ) except for D1 0f =  
where the two are equal as expected. We further note that if both detectors would fail 
completely, the T1T2 section would not generate any Strobe signals and there would be no 
output. Therefore, the COMBO RNG is robust against detector(s) failure in the sense that as 
long as there is any output, its randomness quality is good. 
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Fig. 6. Randomness merits (bias and autocorrelation) of the three sequences generated by the 
COMBO RNG in case when one detector is failing. Detection rate of one detector (D0) was 
kept at its nominal rate of 10 Mcps, while rate of the other detector (D1) was varied from 10 
Mcps down to zero simulating its failure. Shown are ± 1 Gaussian sigma statistical error bars. 
Signal injection attacks on RNGs are well known in the cryptographic art [21,22]. The 
danger stems from the fact that they can be mounted without destruction or tampering with a 
RNG thus leaving no physical evidence, for example via electromagnetic induction or through 
power supply lines. A small coil near the gadget that contains RNG, such as smart card or 
contactless payment card can render it unsecure. Ref. 21 demonstrates a practical attack on a 
RNG in an ATM machine via injection-locking which would enable unauthorized use of a 
stolen credit card. 
Apart from security there is also a functional issue. In [23] many RNGs operate in parallel 
on the same chip in order to achieve a higher speed one, however their electrical interference 
produces such a strong mutual coupling that individual RNGs tend to synchronize and lower 
the total entropy to much below the expected value. Sensitivity to interference signals is 
especially important in mobile phones where a strong signal from the RF transmitter cannot 
be shielded enough by any measure (such as a Faraday cage etc.) to the level below weak 
(quantum) signals from which randomness is extracted. 
Let us now consider the COMBO RNG under attack by injection of a periodic signal 
which causes fake photon detections or “injection events” in detectors. We assume that the 
injected pulses affects equally and simultaneously both detectors. This would in particular be 
the case for a RNG miniaturized to a chip level with the closely spaced detectors of nearly 
identical characteristics. We simulate the attack by mixing the CW light with strong laser 
pulses (PicoQuant PDL 800-D with laser head 676λ =  nm, 39 ps FWHM) via an additional 
beam splitter in front of the of the RNG setup (Fig. 1). Detection probability of a laser pulse is 
greater than 99.7%. In an experiment the intensity of CW light was set such that 
D0 D1 10.00 0.05f f= = ±  Mcps while the periodic frequency of injected laser pulses ( Injectf ) 
was varied from zero to 7 MHz. Results are shown in Fig. 7. The attack generates a deviation 
from otherwise exponential time interval distribution of detected events (consisting of 
intertwined detected photons and injection events). Since BSR section is not sensitive to the 
time information it is quite insensitive to the attack. We see that the randomness merits of the 
output string C  stay zero within statistical errors for 910  bits up to 7 MHz. However by 
examining component strings Y  and T  which are much more sensitive to errors, we see that 
randomness does deteriorate with Injectf . Namely, under deterministic injected signal from the 
detectors, BSR section is bound to generate a deterministic output. In our implementation of 
the BSR section, a bit is generated whenever a photon is detected by either detector and its 
value is identified by a state of the detector D1 (except for the blanking described above). 
Thus, if photon is detected by D0, state of D1 will be 0 (no detection) while if photon is 
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detected by D1 state of D1 is 1. This is correct for a stream of photons from the CW source, 
but when a signal is injected such that both detectors “fire” at the same time (within the 2 ns 
time resolution window of the circuit) the circuit will generate the value of “1”. Thus, every 
injected signal generates a value of “1” in the string S  driving its bias towards positive value, 
and therefore, according to Eq. (6), bias of the string Y  will turn towards negative. This 
effect becomes apparent for Inject 4.5f >  MHz, as shown in Fig. 7. The T1T2 section is by 
definition more sensitive to the time interval distribution and that is clearly visible through 
increasingly negative bias and sharp rise of autocorrelation for Inject 3f >  MHz. 
 
Fig. 7. Randomness merits (bias and autocorrelation) of the three sequences ,Y T  and C  
generated by the COMBO RNG under attack by injection of a periodic signal which causes 
simultaneous fake photon detections in detector with a frequency Injectf . Shown are ± 1 
Gaussian sigma statistical error bars. 
In general, favorable interplay of the two sections (BSR and T1T2) makes the COMBO 
RNG surprisingly robust against detector failure and signal injection attacks. However, some 
deterioration does appear in case of a strong attack conditions or a bad failure of detector(s). 
For practical applications it would therefore be important that the failure and attacks can be 
detected at levels that are far from causing any noticeable randomness deterioration. We 
studied two simple measures: bit generation rate ( )Gf  and blanked events rate ( )Bf  Blanked 
events rate is the rate of events that are discarded by the blanking procedure and therefore are 
not used for the random number generation. In Fig. 8 Gf  (shown by quadratic markers) and 
Bf  (shown by round markers) are plotted as a function of the degree of failure of detectors for 
three scenarios studied above: (i) D0 and D1 failing simultaneously; (ii) only D0 failing; and 
(iii) signal injection attack. For the first scenario (dotted line) Df  is detection rate of both 
detectors; for the second (dashed line) Df  is the detection rate of detector D0; and for the 
third (full line) Df  is the frequency of injected laser pulses. 
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Fig. 8. Bit generation rate Gf  (quadratic dots) and blanked events rate Bf  (round dots) as 
functions of detection rates in three failure and attack scenarios (see the text). Both rates are 
sensitive to irregular operation of the RNG this allowing for robust monitoring and 
failure/attack detection. 
We see that both generation ( Gf ) and blanked events ( Bf ) rates are quite sensitive to 
irregular operation of the RNG with a small advantage of Gf  for scenario (i) and Bf  for 
scenario (iii), whereas either is an equally good measure for scenario (ii). In the failure 
scenarios (i) and (ii) both parameters ( , BGf f ) drop below normal values whereas in the attack 
scenario (iii) both measures rise above their normal values. We thus have two measures, 
either of which (but preferably both) can be used to robustly alert malfunction of the COMBO 
RNG even at levels at which randomness is not noticeably compromised. 
6. Conclusion 
A RNG based on quantum effects in photonic emission and detection is presented. A 
mathematical framework for estimation of randomness quality based on simple measurements 
has been developed. The RNG is unique in several aspects: (1) the method of extraction of 
random bits simultaneously uses both spatial and temporal quantum information contained in 
the system; (2) the RNG is robust against hardware failure and signal injection attack in the 
sense that up to some threshold levels of detector failure or attack frequency randomness is 
virtually intact; (3) malfunction of the RNG, due to detector failure or signal injection, can be 
robustly detected at levels at which randomness is not significantly affected thus enabling 
protection of integrity of generated random bits. It is also shown that generated numbers pass 
the NIST Statistical Test Suite (STS) without the need for any further post-processing. Having 
in mind that partial detector failure scenario is identical to an initial or aging-related 
difference between detectors, we conclude that COMBO RBG is also robust to initial 
components variation and aging, which makes it a good candidate for mass-production or 
chip-level QRNG technology. 
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